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Winston Churchill is supposed to have complained that whenever he asked Britain's three
leading economists for advice about economic policy he received four different opinions--two
from John Maynard Keynes. The image of economists in disarray about economic policy is firmly
embedded in the popular mind, enhanced, no doubt, by the tendency of many journalists to seek
out extreme opposing views on controversial issues. But is the popular image justified? A large-
scale (464 respondents) survey of economists in all fields (Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan, 1992)
concluded that there is considerable consensus among economists, but the 40 questions in their
survey dealt primarily with positive economics, not economic policy. The seven questions that
were clearly about policy--unconditional "should" questions--had a mean entropy score of 0.83,
which indicates a very high level of disagreement.'
In a survey of 50 leading health economists, Fuchs (1996) found considerable
disagreement regarding major issues of health policy.2 The extent of disagreement was
particularly striking when compared with the high level of agreement among the same economists
about the determinants of health and the determinants of health expenditures.3 Furthermore, the
small disagreement that did exist regarding the positive questions seemed to play no role in
explaining policy differences. This result is at variance with Milton Friedman's view (1953) that
policy differences can usually be explained by differences in judgments about positive economics.
This paper reports the results of surveys of specialists in labor economics and public
economics at 40 leading research universities in the United States. We ascertained their opinions
of economic policies in their areas of specialization and measured the extent of agreement or
disagreement. We also attempted to determine the extent to which policy disagreement is related
'Each question allowed three possible answers: disagree, agree, or agree with proviso. The highest
possible entropy score is 1.0,indicatingthat respondents were evenly split among the three answers. A score of
zero indicates that all respondents chose the same answer.
2The mean entropy score was 0.77 for two possible answers: disagree or agree.
3The mean entropy score was 0.52.
—1—to a) differences in estimates of relevant economic parameters; b) differences in values; and c)
differences in political party identification. We used the respondents' opinions regarding their
95% confidence intervals4 for the economic parameters to determine how often the average best
estimate, or most commonly occurring estimate, falls within these intervals. We also compared
their individual uncertainties with the collective uncertainties as reflected in variation across
respondents in the best estimates of the economic parameters.
Description of Surveys
Four main types of questions were used in both the Labor Economics and Public
Economics surveys:5 a) policy opinions to be answered on a continuous scale from "strongly
oppose" to "strongly favor"; b) quantitative best estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
economic parameters; c) values questions (answered on a continuous scale) regarding income
redistribution, efficiency vs. equity, and individual vs. social responsibility;6 and d) political party
identification. The two surveys are very similar in form, but nearly all of the policy and economic
parameter questions are specialty-specific. Two of the policy questions (about increasing AFDC
payments and eliminating the cap on OASI payroll taxes) and two of the parameter questions (on
the Marshallian and Hicksian labor supply elasticities for men 25-54) are the same in both surveys.
The surveys were distributed in the summer of 1996 to economists specializing in labor
economics and public economics on the faculties of the universities with the 40 leading economics
departments in the United States. The 40 leading economics departments were identified from
Scott and Mitias's (1996) ranking of departments, which is based on publication records of the
faculty. Specialists at these universities were identified from listings in the American Economic
Association directory, college catalogs, the 1996 Prentice-Hall Guide to Economics Faculty,
and by personal knowledge. All labor economists and public finance economists in the economics
4Respondents were asked to speci' lower and upper limits of a 95% confidence interval and told that
these limits need not be symmetrical around the best estimate. The term "subjective probability interval" might be
more appropriate than "confidence interval," but we use the latter term in the paper because that was the one used
in the survey.
5See Appendix for copies of the surveys.
Fhe questions referred to as "values" could also be described as "meta" or "non-specific" policy
preferences. The empirical relationship between the responses to these questions and opinions about specific
policies, and the methodological issue involved in attempting to distinguish "values" from positive questions, are
discussed below.
-2-departments at universities with a top 40 economics department were sent a questionnaire. In
addition, questionnaires were sent to many labor and public finance economists at the business
schools and public policy schools at these universities.7 A covering letter (see Appendix)
explained the general purpose of the survey and promised anonymity to the respondents. Fuchs'
secretary at the National Bureau of Economic Research kept track of the responses in order to
facilitate the sending of a follow-up request after two months. A total of 65 replies (response rate
39%) was received for Labor Economics, and 69 replies (response rate 66%) for Public
Economics. There was no significant difference between the responders and nonresponders with
respect to university rank in either survey.8 Every question provided a "no opinion" option; the
percent responding "no opinion" or not providing an answer to each question is reported in the
survey results.
In the Labor Economics questionnaire, we implemented a "split-ballot" experiment in
which the order of the policy and economic parameter questions was randomly reversed in half
the questionnaires. Except for one question--the desirability of increasing AFDC benefits--the
order of the questions had a statistically insignificant effect on the mean responses to the policy
and parameters questions. (Respondents were less likely to support an increase in AFDC benefits
if the questions on the parameters preceded the policy questions, even if we condition on
covariates such as political affiliation and views concerning redistribution.) The response rate was
lower, however, if the economic parameters preceded the policy questions. We interpret the
results of the split-ballot experiment as providing mild support that the questions elicited views
that were not easily manipulated, although the response rate is higher if less technical questions
are asked first.
7ThC Labor Economics survey was sent to all self-identified labor economists at these universities, while
the Public Economics survey was mailed to only a subset of economists outside of economics departments. This
may explain the larger set of economists who were sent the Labor Economics survey, as well as the lower response
rate on the Labor than the Public Economics survey.
81n the Labor Economics survey the mean departmental rank (standard error in parentheses) was 17.9
(1.3) for the responders and 16.8 (1.2) for the nonresponders. In the Public Economics survey the corresponding
figures were 17.3 (1.4) and 16.2 (1.7). Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992) reported a much lower response rate
(29%) for economists in the 10 leading graduate programs than for other members of the American Economic
Association (40%).
-3-Major Conclusions
Before discussing the survey results in detail, we summarize the major conclusions of the
study. First, both surveys reveal a great deal of disagreement among economists about policy
proposals in their areas of specialization. Only one of the 13 proposals (a 25 cent per gallon
increase in the gasoline tax) elicited a strong consensus either in favor or in opposition. Second,
policy positions are usually more closely related to differences in values than to differences in
estimates of relevant economic parameters or to differences in political party identification. This
is clearly evident for both surveys in simple correlations among the different types of variables and
in multiple regression analyses. Third, the average best estimates of the economic parameters
agree well with the ranges summarized in surveys of the relevant literature, but the individual best
estimates are usually widely dispersed around the averages. Moreover, economists, like experts in
many fields, reveal considerable "overconfidence" in their estimates of the economic parameters.
For most questions, a large proportion of the individual confidence intervals do not include the
average best estimate, or even include the value that is covered by the largest number of
confidence intervals. Furthermore, many confidence intervals are small relative to the dispersion
of the individual best estimates. Finally, although the confidence intervals in general appear to be
too narrow, for most questions there is a significant positive correlation between the width of
individual confidence intervals and the absolute deviation of individual best estimates from the
median best estimate. That is, respondents whose best estimates are farther from the median tend
to give wider confidence intervals for those estimates.
Policy Proposals
Table 1 summarizes the responses to the policy questions, which were marked on a
continuous scale from "strongly oppose" (given a value of zero) to "strongly favor" (given a value
of 100), with the neutral mark in the center of the scale given a value of 50. The most striking
result is the extensive disagreement among economists about policy proposals in their specialty.
The median standard deviations are 28.5 for Labor Economics and 29.3 for Public Economics.
Both are more than half the maximum possible standard deviation of 50 which would result if half
the respondents were at one extreme and half at the other. If replies were distributed uniformly
across the entire range the standard deviation would be 28.9, which is close to the observed
values. The median interquartile ranges are 43.6 for Labor Economics and 45.0 for Public
Economics, almost half the maximum possible range of 100. In theory the standard deviation and
-4-the interquartile range could be large even though all the respondents opposed or favored a policy
proposal.9 In practice, however, for only one of the 13 questions (an increase in the gasoline tax)
are at least 75% of the respondents either in favor of or opposed to the policy proposal.
Measured by the average (mean or median) response, labor economists are opposed to
increasing AFDC benefits (Qi), eliminating affirmative action (Q3), and eliminating job training
(Q5). They are in favor of eliminating the OASI cap and reducing the payroll tax rate (Q2) and
are essentially indifferent about increasing the minimum wage (Q4) and increasing unionization
(Q6). The Public Economics respondents oppose increasing AFDC benefits (Qi) and adopting a
value added tax (Q3). They favor increasing the gasoline tax (Q2), state (rather than local)
finance of public education (Q6), and mandatory savings accounts (Q7); they are indifferent about
eliminating the OASI cap (Q4) and expanding IRAs (Q5).
The greatest differences of opinion (measured by the standard deviation and the
interquartile range) among labor economists are over elimination of affirmative action and
elimination ofjob training. In Public Economics the differences of opinion are greatest for
elimination of the OASI cap and expansion of IRAs.
One possible explanation for the substantial differences in policy views is that different
respondents interpret our policy questions to mean different things. For some questions, such as
the mandatory saving accounts question on the Public Economics survey, there are many detailed
features of policy design that would need to be worked out before a policy could be enacted.
Differences in interpretation could play a role in contributing to response variation on these
questions. Other questions, however, are relatively well defined. Raising the minimum wage and
increasing the gasoline tax are examples of policies where we do not think there is substantial
scope for differential interpretation to explain the disparate views.
Estimates of Economic Parameters
Most of the quantitative parameters we inquired about (such as the elasticity of labor
supply) are discussed in economics graduate courses and textbooks; a few (such as the markup on
private annuity contracts) are more esoteric. At least for questions like the labor supply and labor
demand elasticities, we would expect economists in these fields to have given these parameters a
9For example, if half of the respondents scored a proposal at 51, and the other half scored it at 100, then
the interquartile range would be 49, and the standard deviation would be 24.5, even though all of the respondents
would favor the proposal.
-5-good deal of thought. In general, the mean and median best estimates of the various economic
parameters reported in Table 2 accord quite well with the ranges established in surveys of the
relevant literature. There is frequently great variability in the best estimates of the parameters
across members of the profession, however. We begin the discussion by considering the labor
supply questions which are common to both surveys and then highlight specific parameters in each
survey.
Common Questions. We asked labor and public economists about both compensated
(Hicksian) and uncompensated (Marshallian) labor supply elasticities. The labor economists were
asked about these parameters separately for prime-age men and women (Q14-Q17); the public
finance economists were asked identical questions for prime age-men (Qi 1 and Q12). The
similarity between the public finance and labor economists is striking. The typical respondent in
either field believes the male uncompensated labor supply elasticity is close to zero (median of
0.00 for labor economists and .05 for public finance economists), while the compensated elasticity
is small (.20 for both labor and public finance economists). The responses in both surveys are
consistent with much of the empirical research in labor economics, surveyed for example in
Killingsworth (1983) and Pencavel (1987), which finds small wage and income effects for male
labor supply.
Also consistent with the literature, the labor economists tended to report larger
compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities for women than for men. For example,
the median compensated female labor supply elasticity was .43, twice as high as the median
estimate for men. There was also substantial dispersion across labor economists in their best
estimates of the female labor supply elasticities. The interquartile range of the compensated
female labor supply elasticity was .60, some three times as great as the corresponding interquartile
range for men.
Labor Economics. The median best estimate of the output-constant wage elasticity of
labor demand (Q9) is exactly equal to Hamermesh's (1993) "best guess" (-.30) based on his
comprehensive review of the literature. The mean and median best estimates of the total wage
elasticity of labor demand (Q8) are also well within the range identified in Hamermesh's survey.
Additionally, the median labor economist reported that a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage would be associated with a 1 percent decrease in teenage employment (Q13), which
coincides with Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen's (1983) preferred estimate of this parameter based on
-6-time-series data.'° We would expect that economists with a higher estimate ofjob loss due to a
minimum wage increase would be less supportive of the recently passed increase in the minimum
wage, a policy question which we also inquired about.
The mean and median best estimates of the effect of JTPA job training on earnings also
agree well with commonly accepted estimates in the literature. Several studies, for example, find
that the proportionate payoff to job training is greater for women than for men (see LaLonde,
1995 for a survey). The median estimate among labor economists of the earnings effect is 7
percent for adult women and 2 percent for adult men (Qi 1-12). Estimates in the literature tend to
be quite small for disadvantaged youth (see LaLonde, 1995); the small median best estimate for
youth (Q1O) may even overstate the typical estimate in the literature. Those reporting larger
estimates of the payoff to job training would be expected to oppose eliminating the JTPA
program.
In the job training field, many labor economists are currently engaged in a productive
debate on the efficacy of experimental and non-experimental methods (see Heckman and Smith,
1995, for example). With this in mind, we asked a methodological question (Q21) about job
training, namely whether respondents would give more credence to results coming from studies
that employ randomized assignment or structural modeling. Three quarters of respondents
favored random assignment, but a significant minority strongly preferred structural modeling.
Thus, there is not complete consensus on methods in this field.
The median estimate of the effect of unions on wages is 15 percent (Q18), which agrees
extremely well with Lewis' (1963, 1986) literature reviews and re-analyses. There is a notably
tight range of best estimates for this parameter, with the 25" percentile at 10 percent and the 75th
at15 percent. The median best estimate of the effect of unions on productivity (Q19) is zero,
white the mean is slightly positive. The interquartile range is a sizable 10 percentage points.
Given the controversy in the literature over the effect of unions on productivity (such as the views
spanned by Freeman and Medoff, 1984 and Hirsch and Addison, 1986), this finding strikes us as
quite reasonable.
'°A replication of Bmm, Gilroy andKohenby Wellington (1991) s%ith more mnt data is about half as large and
not significantly different from zero, however.
-7-The questionnaire contained a policy question concerning views towards permitting unions
to form if a majority of workers sign cards supporting a union. Allowing card signings would
most likely increase union representation, so economists who believe unions have a positive effect
on productivity should be more likely to favor card signings. The presumed magnitude of the
union wage effect, however, could have two offsetting influences on normative views toward
unions. On the one hand, a larger union wage effect might be expected to increase the allocative
distortion associated with unions. On the other hand, a larger union wage effect would imply a
greater redistributive effect of unions toward workers. Thus, the magnitude of the union wage
effect is expected to have an ambiguous impact on support for card signings.
The typical economist attributes about one-fifth of the male-female wage gap to employer
discrimination. We would expect that economists who report a larger proportion due to
discrimination to more strongly oppose the elimination of affirmative action.
Mother feature of the averages of the best estimates is that they may be internally consis-
tent even though many of the individual economists responses may not be. For example, in the
static tax incidence model, the share of a payroll tax borne by employers is determined by the ratio
of the labor supply elasticity to the sum of the labor supply plus labor demand elasticities. The
average of the median labor economists best estimates of the uncompensated labor supply elastic-
ities for men and women is .15. Thus, the collective wisdom of the profession would imply that
23 percent (.151.65) of the burden of a payroll tax is borne by employers. This implied estimate is
quite close to the 26 percent mean best estimate of the employe?s share of the payroll tax (Q13).
Public Economics. In addition to the questions about labor supply elasticities described
above, respondents to the Public Economics survey were also asked about a number of other
parameters that might affect their policy views. They were asked for their best estimates of the
compensated price elasticity of demand for gasoline over a horizon of two to five years (Q9). The
median response on this question was -0.40, which is bounded by DahI's (1986) finding, in her
survey of empirical studies on gasoline demand, of-0.3 as the short-run demand elasticity and
-0.55 as the long-run elasticity. More than half of the respondents suggested a best estimate for
this elasticity of between -0.3 and -0.7. This parameter should play a role in a respondent's
assessment of the desirability of raising the gasoline excise tax, with higher elasticities associated
with higher deadweight losses from the tax, and therefore less support for raising the tax.
We asked several questions about the taxation of capital income and its effect on invest-
ment and economic growth. The median estimate of the economic growth effects of replacing all
-8-capital income taxes with wage taxes (Q10)wasa 0.2 percentage point annual growth increase.
Respondents displayed substantial dispersion in their best estimate of this parameter, however.
The 25th percentile response was 0.01 percentage points, and the 75th percentile response was
0.50 percentage points. This spread reflects substantial dispersion in the results that emerge from
computable general equilibrium models that are used to study the effects of fbndamental tax
reform. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) show using a numerical model that the effect of a switch
from income to wage taxation is sensitive to discount rates and factor supply elasticities.
Ailowing firms to expense their capital outlays, rather than depreciate them as under
current law, and making up the resulting revenue shortfall by raising the statutory corporate
income tax rate, is generally recognized as a pro-investment policy. The median best estimate of
the resulting increase in plant and equipment investment (Q8) is 10 percent, with an interquartile
range of 5 to 15 percent. There is currently a substantial empirical controversy, summarized for
example in Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1995), on the effect of investment tax credits and
depreciation incentives on corporate investment. Our survey results are more consistent with
those who argue that investment incentives affect investment outlays than with those who take the
opposite view. Those who believe that reducing the tax burden on new investment has a large
effect on such investment should be more likely to support policy reforms that shift the tax burden
from capital income to labor income or consumption, such as replacing the current income tax
with a value added tax.
We asked one question (Q18) about the concentration of capital ownership: what fraction
of net worth is held by the richest one percent of households? The median response, 30 percent,
is close to the estimated value of 28.6 percent from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances
reported in Poterba and Samwick (1995). There was substantial variation in the answers to this
question, however, with an interquartile range of thirty percentage points. This was also the
question with the lowest nonresponse rate; only three of sixty-nine survey respondents did not
answer. This may reflect the "factual" nature of this question, which is not affected by issues of
estimation strategy, model specification, or data choice. The concentration of wealth could affect
respondents views on switching from capital to wage or consumption taxation, since it determines
the concentration of the gains or losses from such a policy switch.
We also asked about the effect of recent tax changes on economic growth. The median
response indicated that, had the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) been allowed to remain in
force as passed, the steady-state GDP growth rate would have been one percent per year higher
-9-than under the previous tax system (Q20). TRA86 reduced inter-asset differences in effective tax
rates, and it lowered marginal tax rates on labor income for a substantial number of higher-income
households. Reflecting the lack of consensus on some of the underlying parameters which
determine the effects of such a poiicy, however, the interquartile range for the responses to this
question is large: 0.2 percentage points to 3.0 percentage points.
In contrast to the results for TRA86, the median response to a question on how the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1993 (BEA93) would affect economic growth (Q21) was zero.
BEA93 raised tax rates on a small set of high-income taxpayers, unlike the broad-based changes
in tax rates that were enacted in 1986. The interquartile range of 1.5 percentage points for the
responses regarding the 1993 legislation was smaller than the range of 2.8 percentage points for
the 1986 legislation. Comparing the best estimates of the consequences of either tax bill with the
observed effects of these tax reforms is difficult, since there is no way to hold constant all of the
other factors that affect actual growth rates.
One specific question (Q13) concerned the impact of Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) on national saving. Because IRAs were restricted by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, our
question focused on the effect of IRAs in the 1981-1986 period. Most public economists believe
that there is a noticeable positive effect of IRA contributions on national saving, equal to roughly
20 percent of these contributions. It is important to note that this represents an addition to
national,notpersonal, saving, and it is therefore net of any reduction in other personal saving or
other government saving. The consensus view generally supports Poterba, Venti, and Wise's
(1996) conclusion that a substantial fraction of the inflow to IRAs represented new personal
saving. If IRA contributions are deducted from federal income taxes at a typical marginal tax rate
of 25 percent, so that one-quarter of IRA contributions represent a reduction in national saving
through lost current government revenue, the median estimate from our survey respondents
suggests that roughly half of IRA contributions represent additions to personal saving."
Our survey included three questions that bear on the current Social Security reform
debate. The first (Q14) asked about the price of individual annuity contracts available in the
private market relative to the actuarially fair value of these contracts. If the current price of
annuities is high relative to their actuarial value, government-provided Social Security is generally
"This estimate stands in contrast to Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) claim that most IRA saving has
come at the expense of other personal saving.
-10-viewed as more attractive, since it offersindividualsa real annuity. Friedman and Warshawsky
(1990) present evidence that the ratio we asked about was between 1.3 and 1.5 in the early 1 980s.
The survey responses are close to this range, with a median of 1.30, and an interquartile range of
1.2 to 1.5. However, this rather specialized question resulted in a high rate of nonresponse, with
35 percent of our respondents choosing not to answer. There was the same nonresponse rate on
our question about the effects of expensing on corporate investment, and a 30 percent rate of
nonresponse on the question concerning the economic growth effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986.12 The highest rate of nonresponse (51 percent) was to the question on the effects of the
1993 tax legislation. The nonresponse rates tend to be lower on questions that would feature
more prominently in an undergraduate field course in public economics.
The second question that we asked about Social Security concerned the ratio of the
administrative costs from a system of mandatory private saving accounts, and the current pay-as-
you-go defined benefit system (Q19). There are many current proposals to create systems of
mandatory private saving accounts as part of Social Security refonn, patterned to various degrees
on the experiences in other countries (see Gramlich (1996) for an overview). The greater is the
ratio of administrative costs from a system of individual accounts relative to the current system,
the less attractive the reform options appear. This is a highly speculative question, since it is not
clear how the experience of other nations would generalize to the United States, or how the U.S.
historical experience applies today. Thus it is no surprise that there is wide dispersion in the
responses. The median estimate is a cost ratio of 1.5 to 1, but the 25th percentile response was 1
to 1, and the 75th percentile response was 3 to 1. Some responses indicated much larger values,
as indicated by the difference between the mean and median responses on this question (2.6 versus
1.5) and the standard deviation of responses (2.7).
The final Social Security question that we asked concerned private saving. There has been
a long-standing empirical debate concerning the effect of the current pay-as-you-go Social
Security system in the United States on national saving; Feldstein (1974) and Barro (1974)
represent early contributions to this debate. We asked respondents to estimate what the personal
saving rate, which is currently about five percent of disposable income, would have been in the
'2Auerbachand Slemrod (1997) provide a comprehensive survey of the academic research that has
focused on the economic effects of TRAS6. They conclude thatithas been difficulttodiscern the consequences of
the reform in part because of the complexity of the reform itself and in part because many of the behavioral
elasticities that determine the effect of tax changes may be small.
—11—absence of a Social Security program (Q17). The responses clearly indicate that most public
finance economists believe that the current Social Security program has reduced personal saving.
The median response to our question suggested a private saving rate of eight percent of
disposable income if there were no Social Security; this implies a three percent of disposable
income saving reduction due to this program. These results represent an implicit rejection of the
"Ricardian equivalence" view of budget deficits and unfUnded Social Security programs suggested
in Barro (1974).
We asked one question that bears on the choice of state versus local financing for public
education: how would average student test scores be affected by centralizing school finance at the
state level (Q15). Several recent empirical studies have suggested that state versus local financing
affects student performance, but the studies, such as Hoxby (1995) and Fuchs and Reklis (1994),
reach conflicting conclusions. The median response indicated that state fUnding would have no
effect on test scores; the 25th percentile response was a -2.0 percentage point change, and the
75th percentile was a +2.0 percent change. These responses are consistent with relatively little
clear evidence on this issue. Even though the small existing literature makes it unclear how
respondents formed their views of how state financing affects student outcomes, the response to
this question does have a strong predictive value in explaining respondents' views about how to
finance schools.
One question where there remains substantial disagreement concerns the fraction of the
corporate income tax that is borne by capital income (Q16). This is a question that is at the core
of a substantial body of research in public economics, beginning with Harberger (1962), and
subsequently including a number of computable general equilibrium studies. The median response
is that 40 percent of the tax is borne by capital, but the interquartile range spans 45 percentage
points, from 20 to 65 percent. The responses suggest that public finance economists believe that
the corporate income tax is borne by both capital and labor, but that there is significant
disagreement about the precise division.
Textbook discussions also suggest substantial uncertainty in the allocation of the corpor-
ate tax burden. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), for example, draw on earlier studies and suggest
that capital's burden is from 0.62 to 1.6 times the revenue collected with a corporate income tax.
Rosen (1995) is more agnostic, and simply writes that "the economic consequences of the corpor-
ation tax are among the most controversial subjects in public finance." Part of this disagreement
may reflect different views about key parameters that affect the burden of corporate income taxes,
-12-such as the degree of openness of world capital markets and the interest elasticity of saving. It is
also possible that many recent studies have focused on the efficiency gains of shifting from current
corporate income tax rules to alternative rules, and that as a result, the incidence questions that
once received greater attention are no longer as salient for public finance researchers.
Values and Political Party Identjflcation
Responses to the values questions (see Table 3) were scored on a continuous scale from
zero for the extreme left to 100forthe extreme right. There is considerable difference among the
respondents with regard to values, but the differences are smaller than for the policy questions.'3
The median standard deviation is 23.7 for Labor Economics and 21.4 for Public Economics,
somewhat less than for the policy questions. The median interquartile range is 27.3 for Labor
Economics and 26.0 for Public Economics, much less than for the policy questions. Differences
about policy may depend not only on differences in values but also on differences in predictions
about the consequences of policies even when values are identical.
The average responses to the values questions mostly fall in the middle of the range. In
both surveys only one of the four questions--increase redistribution with lump sum transfers--has
the mean and the median more than ten points above (in this case) or below the neutral mark. In
Public Economics the median (but not the mean) score for social vs. individual responsibility is
also more than ten points away from the neutral mark, in favor of individual responsibility.
The responses to the values questions are similar in the two surveys, with one significant
exception: the Public Economics respondents place a higher value on efficiency than do the Labor
Economists. This can be inferred from the difference in their responses to Questions 22 and 23.
The former asks about income redistribution, while the latter asks the same question under the
assumption that redistribution could be accomplished without any efficiency loss. When each
respondent's response to Q22 is subtracted from their response to Q23, the mean difference for
Public Economics is 16.41 (1.36), while the mean for Labor Economics is 11.55 (1.92). The
difference between the means is significant at p C.05.A difference between the two groups of
specialists can also be seen in the responses to Q24 concerning the efficiency-equity tradeoff The
mean response for Public Economics is 55 (3.00), while for Labor Economics it is only 48 (2.90).
The wording of the values questions (different from the "strongly oppose--strongly favor" wording of the
policy questions) may help explain the smaller extent of disagreement.
-13-The difference between the means is significant at p C.10.The differences in the responses may
reflect differences in the focus of the two fields. Public economics is centrally concerned with the
tradeoffs between efficiency and equity, and with the design of policies to minimize deadweight
losses, while these issues may receive less attention in labor economics.
The four values questions are highly correlated with one another in both surveys: the
median coefficient (absolute value) is 0.71; the range is from 0.52 to 0.83.'Thetwo income dis-
tribution questions are positively correlated with social responsibility and all three are negatively
correlated with the efficiency-equity choice. When the direction of the latter is reversed, most
respondents align consistently along a "left-right" political continuum defined as the left favoring
more income redistribution, equity over efficiency, and social over individual responsibility.
Political party identification is approximately the same in both surveys: slightly more than
half the respondents are Democrats, about one-fourth are Independents, and about one-sixth are
Republicans. Party identification is closely related to responses to the values questions.
Democrats lean to the left (as defined above), Republicans lean strongly to the right, and
Independents are slightly to the right of center. The mean scores for the four values questions in
Labor Economics are Democrats 62, Republicans 32, and Independents 46. In Public Economics,
the mean scores are Democrats 67, Republicans 28, and Independents 46.15
CorrelationsAmong Types of Variables
Table 4 summarizes the coefficients of correlation among the different types of
questions.'6 We find that the relationship between values and policy opinions is much stronger
than the relationship between values and economic parameters, or between economic parameters
and policy opinions. We also find that the relationship between values and policy opinions is
considerably stronger in Labor Economics (0.53) than in Public Economics (0.35). The difference
between the distribution of coefficients in the two surveys is significant at p <.05by the chi-
square test. The difference between the surveys, however, appears to result from differences in
correlations among the policy questions are much lower, and the two surveys differ. The median
coefficient (absolute value) is 0.39forLabor Economics and 0.20 for Public Economics.
'5The standard errors of the means are 2.3, 6.6, and 2.5 in Labor Economics and 2.0, 3.5, and 5.0 in
Public Economies.
'6Complete matrices of coefficients for all results summarized in this paper are available on request.
-14-the questions rather than from differences between the two specialties when asked the same
question. Of the eight (4 values x 2 policy questions) corresponding correlations, the Public
Economics coefficients are higher in six cases. The median correlation coefficient for Public
Economics is 0.57, but only 0.43 for Labor Economics.
The correlations between values and economic parameters, albeit small on average, are
statistically significant more often than is likely to result from chance. There are two possible
explanations. The estimates may be influenced by values and/or the respondents' estimates of
parameters may influence their attitudes toward income redistribution, the tradeoff between
efficiency and equity, and the like.
The correlations between policy opinions and economic parameters are substantially
weaker than those between policy opinions and values. Furthermore, even when the correlations
are limited to those that are theoretically related (for example, the elasticity of labor supply and
the elimination of the OASI cap), the coefficients, on average, tend to be only slightly higher and
are not significantly different from the other policy-parameter correlations.
Policy Proposal Regressions
We now consider the relationship between respondents' views on policy questions and
their responses to our questions about economic parameters, values, and political party identi-
fication in a multivariate context. We present parallel results from the Labor Economics survey
(Table 5) and the Public Economics survey (Table 6). Each table reports two sets of results.
The upper panel in each table reports summary statistics from regression analyses that
relate a respondent's view on a policy issue to a subset of the respondent's answers on positive
questions about economic parameters, along with his responses to questions about values and
party affiliation. The underlying regression specification for POLICY response i by respondent j
is:
POLICY1J =POSITIVE1*a1+VALUES*13 +PARTY*y+ (1)
The positive questions that are included as explanatory variables in each equation depends on the
policy question being analyzed, so POSITIVE depends on i, The explanatory variables for values
and party are the same for all policy questions, so VALUES and PARTY are not policy-specific.
The upper panels of Tables 5 and 6 report the p-values at which we reject the null hypothesis that
a1 =0,f31 =0,and y =0,respectively.
-15-The lower panels report p-values for tests of the same coefficient restrictions, but from
regressions that do not include all of the covariates in (I). Rather, we regressed responses to the
policy questions onof (a) the set of positive variables, (b) the set of values variables, or (c)
the set of party variables. An example of a specification that underlies the results in the lower
panels is therefore
POLICY,J =VALUESJtPI+c. (2)
The difference between the results in the upper and lower panels is a function of the changes in
the coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables, and the precision of these estimates, when
we expand the set of control variables.
For each policy question, we identi& the set of positive questions about economic
parameters that are most likely to bear on that question, and include the responses to those
questions as the explanatory variables labeled "economic parameters." The set of economic
parameter variables that are included in the regression specifications therefore varies from one
policy question to another. Some of the issues that we have asked about are relatively simple
policies, on which respondents' views are likely to depend on a relatively small set of economic
parameters. Others are more complex policies for which views may be affected by a range of
different parameter values. Tables 5 and 6 enumerate the set of economic parameter explanators
used in each policy response regression.
Some of our regression specifications include the response to only a single question about
an economic parameter, while others include responses to as many as seven different positive
questions. When we attempt to explain policy positions on increasing the gasoline tax, for
example, the only positive question that we include as an independent variable is the best estimate
of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline. Similarly, for explaining views about changes in the
payroll tax rate, we include only the Hicksian labor supply elasticity, and for increasing reliance on
state financing of schools, we include only the respondent's belief about how state funding affects
test scores.
At the other extreme, when we try to explain respondents' views about replacing the
current federal income tax system with a value added tax, we include responses to seven positive
questions, including the effect of more generous depreciation allowances (expensing) on capital
investment, the Hicksian labor supply elasticity, the incidence of the corporate income tax, the
concentration of household net worth, and the effect of two recent tax reforms (TRAS6 and the
1993 Budget Enforcement Act) on the level of GDP. A long list of economic parameters are
-16-relevant for views about the VAT because introducing a VAT would change tax rates on capital
income as well as labor income, and it would have potentially substantial redistributive effects.
There are more policy questions with large numbers of explanatory economic parameters
on the public economics survey than on the labor economics survey. The maximum number of
explanatory parameters on a labor economics policy question is three, for the policy question
about the elimination ofjob training. There are three public economics questions with three or
more explanatory parameter questions. This may reflect the somewhat more complex nature of
some of the policy questions in public economics.
Consider the findings for the labor economists first. The adjusted R2s in the top panel of
Table 5 indicate that one-fifth to one-half of the variability in policy positions can be accounted
for by the variables we have identified. When all the explanatory variables are included in the
model together, those measuring values consistently have a statistically significant effect on policy
positions. The four values questions are highly correlated, which makes it difficult to interpret the
effect of any one of these variables. In results not presented here, we have taken the simple
average of the four values questions, and included this variable instead of the four separate values
measures in the regression.'7 The estimated effects of this average "left value" variable
consistently are in the direction that one would expect--labor economists expressing a stronger
preference for redistribution, equity, and social responsibility are more likely to support an
increase in AFDC benefits, elimination of the social security earnings cap, an increase in the
minimum wage, and union card signings, and less likely to support the elimination of affirmative
action or federal job training.
In the top panel of Table 5,theeconomic parameters only have a statistically significant
effect at the .10 level for one policy--eliminating affirmative action. Economists who believe that
a higher fraction of the male-female earnings gap is due to discrimination are more likely to
oppose the elimination of affirmative action. When the economic parameters are included by
themselves, the measures of the payoff to job training are significantly related to the hypothetical
policy of eliminating federal job training programs (see bottom of Table 5). Additionally, labor
economists who believe that unions enhance productivity are more supportive of card signings
when the values and party variables are excluded from the equation. The insignificant effect of
17 calculating this avenge, we took 100minusQ24 so that larger values of all the variables would imply more
redistnlxttion or equity.
-17-most of the economic parameters is not due to a lack of dispersion in best estimates of the
parameters; recall that there is considerable dispersion in the best estimates of the economic
parameters among survey respondents.
Surprisingly, the expected teenage job loss due to the minimum wage is insignificantly
related to labor economists' views towards a minimum wage hike, But if one large outlier is
eliminated from the sample, the relationship becomes statistically significant. Even without this
outlying observation, however, the employment effect of the minimum wage has an insignificant
effect on normative views toward the minimum wage in the multiple regression model in the top
panel of the table. The relatively weak relationship between economists' views of the effect of the
minimum wage on employment and their policy position on the minimum wage is surprising in
light of the rancorous debate over research on the employment effects of the minimum wage
during the latest minimum wage increase. One explanation is that labor economists place greater
weight on the distributional effects of the minimum wage than on the employment effects. Addi-
tionally, the debate could have been driven by policy interests from outside the profession, or by
concern over the theoretical relevance of the research rather than its immediate policy relevance.
Political party has only a weak effect on policy positions when the four values measures
are also included in the regression. But when the political party dummy variables are the only
explanatory variables, they typically have a statistically significant and sizable impact on policy
positions.
The results in Table 6 suggest that roughly one-fifth of the variation in respondent's views
on typical policy questions in public economics is explicable using the set of economic parameter
estimates, values, and measures of political party affiliation that we have collected. The median
adjusted R2 for the seven public economics policy questions is 0.21, which is less than half of the
comparable measure for the six labor market policies that labor economists were asked to
evaluate. We suspect that this disparity is explained by the greater complexity of many of the
policy issues in public economics relative to those in labor economics, and not by systematic
differences between public economists and labor economists. The adjusted R2s on the two policy
questions that were included in both the labor and public economics surveys (raising AFDC
benefits and eliminating the cap on payroll tax earnings) are higher among public economists than
among labor economists. This suggests that the lower median R2 on the public economics
questions is due to the questions, not the respondents.
-18-The results in the upper panel of Table 6 indicate that in most cases we cannot reject either
the null hypothesis that beliefs about economic parameters have no effect on policy choices, or the
null hypothesis that party identification is unrelated to policy views. With respect to economic
parameters, we reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients on the included variables for only
two policies--expanding IRAs, and increasing the role of states in funding public schools. At
conventional confidence levels, we never reject the null hypothesis of no effect for the questions
about the respondent's party identification.
The individual regression coefficients, which are not shown in Table 6, reveal coherent
relationships between views on economic parameters and views on the policy issues of IRA
expansion and changing state funding of education. With respect to IRAs, there is a strong and
statistically significant relationship between the fraction of IRA contributions that a respondent
thought represented a net addition to national saving, and the respondent's enthusiasm for
expanding IRAs. With respect to school finance reform, those respondents who believed that a
higher fraction of school funding from the state was associated with higher test scores were more
likely to favor increased spending at the state level.
Our findings with respect to the predictive power of "values" questions are much stronger
than those for economic parameters and political party affiliation. We reject the null hypothesis of
no effect of "values" responses on policy views for five of the seven policy questions. The two
questions where values do not appear to play a role are those regarding increased state-level
funding of public education, and the institution of a system of mandatory saving accounts as a
partial alternative to the current pay-as-you-go Social Security system.
To explore the relationship between values and policy views, we once again constructed
the one-dimensional "left value" variable described above. Respondents with higher scores on this
variable were more likely to support an increase in AIFDC benefits, eliminating the OASDI tax
cap, and state education financing. They were less likely to support adoption of a value added
tax, perhaps because of the perceived regressive nature of this tax, or the expansion of IRAs. One
interesting finding was a strong positive relationship between the "left value" score and support
for raising the gasoline tax. While many have argued that the gasoline tax is regressive (although
see Poterba (1991) for references as well as a contrary view), it may be that those who are
concerned about equity are nevertheless prepared to raise the gasoline tax because of the
expenditure programs that they envision higher revenues as supporting.
-19-The lower panel of Table 6 presents the results from more limited regression specifications
that relate policy views to one of the three sets of potential explanatory variables. Comparing
these results with those in the upper panel suggests that there is substantial multicollinearity
between "party"and"values." While we never reject the null hypothesis that the party affiliation
variables are unrelated to policy views in the multivariate specifications, when party affiliation is
the only explanatory variable, we reject this null hypothesis at conventional confidence levels for
four of the seven policy variables. There is very little difference between the multivariate and the
separate specifications in the results concerning the values variables. This pattern suggests that
the values variables predict party variables. When values are included in the regression equation,
they reduce the marginal explanatory power of the party variables.
In spite of the statistically significant coefficient estimates that emerge in the lower panel
of Table 6, the more restricted regressions in the lower panel necessarily explain less of the
variation in respondents' views on policy issues than the expanded regressions in the upper panel.
For example, the restricted models with party identification as an independent variable explain
only nine percent of the response variation for a typical policy question.
In summary, the regressions in both surveys explain a significant portion of the variance in
policy opinions, but much remains unexplained, especially for the Public Economics proposals. In
both surveys, the relationship between policy opinions and values is much stronger than between
policy opinions and theoretically relevant economic parameters or political party identification.
Overconfidence of Respondents
Experts in many fields, ranging from demography to physics to stock price forecasting,
evidence systematic overconfidence in their ability to provide quantitative estimates or predictions
in their specialties.'8 In these fields, overconfidence has been assessed by comparing the
predictions of experts to realizations of specific outcomes. For example, predictions about the
weather can be compared to the actual weather. In our survey, we do not know the true
parameter values with which to compare respondents' answers, so we define overconfidence in
three ways: a) if a large proportion of the 95% confidence intervals do not include the average
best estimate (mean or median); b) if the value that is covered by the largest number of confidence
ISSee Shlyakhter and Kammen (1992); Shlyakhter, Kammen, Broido, and Wilson (1994); Gordon and
Kammen (1996).
-20-intervals is nonetheless excluded from relatively many respondents' intervals;'9 c) if the average
(mean or median) width of the confidence intervals is small relative to the variation in the best
estimates (standard deviation or interquartile range).
In the first definition we rely on the assumption that the distribution of reported best
estimates is centered on the true economic parameter. If this were the case, the mean and median
would provide unbiased estimates of the true parameter. In principle, only 5% of the 95%
confidence intervals would be expected to exclude the true parameter if respondents reported
intervals independently. But because the mean or median best estimate is a noisy estimate of the
true parameter, we could expect somewhat more than 5% to exclude the sample mean or
median.2° Our second definition provides a lower bound on the extent of overconfidence because
it is possible that the value (or values) contained by the largest number of confidence intervals is
not the true parameter. Thus, this definition provides a conservative measure of the extent of
overconfidence. In the third definition, we assume the dispersion in reported best estimates
represents the uncertainty underlying the profession's views of the true parameter. In this
scenario, we can ask: Is the typical width of the 95%confidenceintervals consistent with the
underlying dispersion among members of the profession? If the width of the intervals is narrow
relative to the dispersion in the profession, than the typical economist believes he or she has more
precision than the profession.
Figure 1 displays these measures of overconfidence. According to our definitions, there is
no overconfidence in situation I: both respondents (1 and 2) have 95% confidence intervals that
contain the mean best estimate and the most commonly occurring value. (The most commonly
occurring value falls in the range from the lower bound of C to the upper bound of C1.) The
confidence intervals are also wide relative to the standard deviation of the best estimates.2' In
situation II there is overconfidence. The respondents have the same best estimates as in I, but
each confidence interval is considerably narrower. Neither confidence interval includes the mean
best estimate. Because the intervals do not overlap, one (but not both) encompasses the most
'9This measure was suggested to us by Lincoln Moses.
2°This statement follows if the best estimates are independent of the confidence intervals. i1 as seems
tikely, the location of the confidence intervals is related to the best estimates, one might expect fewer than 5% of
the intervals would fail to include the best estimate.
2'In Figure 1, the standarddeviationequals (B2-) =(B-B1).This assumes division by N rather than N-i.
-21-commonly occurring value, so 50% reject the most accepted value. Moreover, the width of both
intervals is small relative to the standard deviation of best estimates. In situation HI the
respondents have confidence intervals that are as wide as in I, but their best estimates are much
farther apart. The result is similar to situation II. Neither confidence interval includes the mean
best estimate, only one of them includes the most accepted value(s), and both are small relative to
the standard deviation of the best estimates.
Table 7 shows that for most of the questions about economic parameters, the individual
95% confidence intervals do not include the mean best estimate for a large percentage of
respondents. In the Labor Economics survey, 4 1.4% of reported confidence intervals fail to
contain the mean best estimate of the parameter for the typical (median) question. This figure is
lower for Public Economics at 33.6%, but still substantially above the 5% benchmark.22 In both
surveys for all questions, the confidence intervals are more likely to contain the median best
estimate than the mean. For the typical question, the rejection rate of the median best estimate is
28.8% for Labor Economics and 21.5% for Public Economics.
The rejection rate for both the mean and the median exceeds 15% for almost every
question in both surveys, with one notable exception. The mean best estimate of the effect of
unions on wages (LE QIS) falls outside only 11.7% of the confidence intervals; for the median
best estimate, the rejection rate is only 8.3%. Among the 20 questions in Table 7, this question
stands out for the remarkable degree of unanimity among the respondents and the extent to which
their individual confidence intervals embrace that unanimity. This probably reflects the influence
of H. Gregg Lewis (1963,1986) who devoted many years to studying the impact of unions on
wages and was able to reconcile the diverse findings of many different investigators.
The last column of Table 7 reports results for our second measure of overconfidence: the
percent of confidence intervals that do not include the value that is contained in the largest
number of intervals. For the median question in both surveys, 21% of intervals fail to include the
most accepted value. For each question the fraction of intervals that exclude the most accepted
value exceeds 5%,althoughthe questions on the union wage effect (LE Q18), youth job training
(LE Q10), and IRAs and savings (PE Q13) are notably close to the 5% rejection rate. Confidence
22Notice that byChebyshevs inequality,at most one-quarter of a distribution can lie beyond two standard
deviations of the mean. Thus if respondents implicitly placed two-standard-deviation bounds around their best
estimates in providing confidence intervals, there is no conceivable distribution that reconciles the distribution of
the best estimates with the confidence intervals.
-22-intervals for the female labor supply elasticity (LEQ15)exhibit the highest rate of over-
confidence, with 40.4% of intervals excluding the most accepted value. Because this measure of
overconfidence provides a lower bound estimate of the proportion of intervals that exclude the
true economic parameter, it is clear that a sizable portion of the profession evidences
overconfidence in their answers.
Additional evidence of respondent overconfidence is presented in Table 8. In a normal
distribution, the width of a symmetric 95% confidence interval is equal to 3.92 times the standard
deviation. With this in mind, we compare the interval widths to the standard deviation of the best
estimates across respondents. The standard deviation of the best estimates provides a plausible
benchmark for the profession's uncertainty, which would be reflected in individual's confidence
intervals if they were not overconfident. In the Labor Economics survey, however, only one
question (the effect of unions on wages) has a mean confidence interval width of approximately
four times the standard deviation of the best estimate; the median question has a ratio of 1.82.
The median ratio in Public Economics is larger at 2.28, indicating wider confidence intervals on
average relative to the variation in best estimates. To eliminate the possible role of outliers in the
comparison of individual and collective uncertainty, we also compare the median confidence
interval with the interquartile range of the best estimates. In a normal distribution, this ratio
would be almost 3.0. Again we find that the average confidence interval is relatively narrow, with
a median ratio of only 1.50 for Labor Economics. We again find that the median ratio is higher
for Public Economics (2.00), consistent with the difference between the two surveys that was
apparent in Table 7.
It is possible that the low ratios shown in Table 8 result from incomplete specification of
the questions about economic parameters. For example, economists' estimates of the effect ofjob
training on wages might differ, depending on the state of the labor market. If respondents made
different assumptions, they might provide different best estimates of the effect even if their
estimates would have been identical given the same assumption. Thus, incomplete specification
could contribute to the observed variation in best estimates. At the extreme, the observed
variation in best estimates could be simply "noise" attributable to incomplete specification. On the
other hand, we would not expect incomplete specification to have an effect on the width of the
-23-confidence interval, as distinct from its location, as it is likely that respondents answered the
confidence interval question with their specifications of the question in mind.23
If incomplete specification results in greater variation in best estimates without affecting
the width of the confidence intervals, the ratios in Table 8 will understate the true ratio of the
width of confidence intervals to the variation in best estimates (assuming complete specification).
Although we do not know the extent of the incomplete specification problem, the following cal-
culation suggests that it would have to be extremely large to account for the low ratios in Table 8.
Let; represent respondent i's best estimate for question X. Suppose there are multiple ways of
interpreting the question, denotedj. We can write: =p+ + 8, where c and ôjrepresent
person-specific and question-interpretation disturbances, and are assumed to be homoskedastic
and independently distributed with mean 0. The population mean best estimate over all possible
interpretations of the question is denoted p. In this setup, the standard deviation of best estimates
across all respondents is sqrt[d6 + do]. Incomplete specification implies that d,> 0. If the
variance in best estimates due to variable interpretation equals half the variance in best estimates
for a given question interpretation [o= di,],the standard deviation of best estimates would be
sqrt[2]sqrt[d6 ,sothe ratio of the confidence interval width to the standard deviation of best
estimates would need to be inflated by sqrt[2]. Thus, a ratio of 2.0 would become 2.8, still well
below the 3.92 benchmark for a normal. For the true ratio to equal 3.92, incomplete specification
would have to account for approximately four-fifths of the observed variability in best estimates.
The results presented in Table 9 also suggest that more than incomplete specification is at
work. The first row summarizes the coefficients of correlation across respondents between the
absolute deviation of the best estimate from the median best estimate and the width of the
confidence interval. The coefficient is significantly positive for more than two-thirds of the
questions; the median coefficients are 0.43 for Labor Economics and 0.48 for Public Economics.
The high correlations could arise if there were respondents who generally gave best estimates that
are far from the median and who also generally gave wide confidence intervals. This explanation,
however, is soundly rejected by the results shown in the second row of Table 9. These
coefficients were obtained by correlating the absolute difference of the best estimate from the
median best estimate with the width of the confidence interval for all possible combinations of
ff respondents' uncertainty over question interpretation leadstowider confidence intervals, then our
measures will be biased against finding overconfidence.
-24-questions except those reported in the first row (where both variables pertain to the same
question). On average, there is no correlation when the questions are not the same, showing that
the results in the first row are not attributable to some special heterogeneity among the
respondents. The last two rows of Table 9 offer fbrther confirmation for this conclusion. When
the correlations are limited to pairs of questions that are similar (e.g., the Marshallian and
Hicksian labor supply elasticities), a tendency toward positive coefficients similar to (but not as
strong as) those in the first row can be seen.
Theoretically, the high correlations shown in the first row of Table 9 could result from
some respondents giving a best estimate which they know is far from the predominant view and
concomitantly providing a wide confidence interval to accommodate the predominant view. This
explanation is not supported by the data. Logistic regressions of rejection of the median best esti-
mates on the absolute difference from the median best estimate are highly significant. The median
p value for the odds ratio in 20 equations is .005, and in only two equations is thep value> .05.
In summary, respondents tend to be overconfident about their estimates of economic
parameters. However, they do tend to give wider confl4ence intervals when their best estimates
are farther from the average best estimate.
Future research
The two surveys described in this paper reveal that both labor economists and public
finance economists give widely disparate estimates of many important economic parameters such
as elasticities of labor demand and labor supply. Because these parameters play key roles in
governmental and private economic models, one challenge to economic research is to explain why
empirical studies yield such varied results. In particular, we need a better understanding of how
differences in research methods, data sources, and specification contribute to differences in expert
opinion. Sustained attempts at reconciliation of diverse empirical results might achieve for other
parameters what Lewis was able to accomplish for the union wage effect.
Another important finding is widespread overconfidence of economists in their estimates
of economic parameters. Perhaps fUrther research can explain why economists attach such strong
priors to their own estimates, even when those estimates are far from the consensus in the survey
literature.
Our study also reveals that economists hold widely disparate views about specific policy
proposals in their specialties. Policy differences are explained, in part, by regressions that include
-25-economic parameters, political party identification, and especially values, but much remains
unexplained. This is particularly true for policy proposals in Public Economics. Future research
should aim at discovering additional explanations for the policy differences. What is the role of
differences in views about the translation of policy proposals into specific legislation and the
implementation of that legislation? It is often said that "The Devil is in the details." Consider, for
example, the policy regression for mandatory saving accounts, which had by far the lowest
adjusted 1t2. Perhaps the respondents had very different views of the details of a mandatory
saving program, and these differences were not correlated with their values, political party
identification, or estimates of economic parameters.
One issue that our questions did not address is the type of information that would lead
economists to revise their views on policy proposals. Future surveys might therefore investigate
whether respondents hold policy views that they describe as subject to modification based on new
empirical findings, as well as the type of new findings that would lead to such revision.
One of the most important empirical results of this study is the strong correlation between
policy positions and values, but an understanding of this relationship requires further research.
The questions we have designated as "values" could also be described as "meta" or "non-specific"
policy preferences. Where do these values or preferences come from? Many economists define a
"value" as a well-specified objective function. But the question remains: Why do different
economists prefer different functions? If most economists are consequentialists (Diamond 1997),
differences in values could reflect differences in judgments about the consequences that flow from
them. That is, there may be other kinds of positive questions embedded in the values questions.
For instance, judgments about the effects of income redistribution on political harmony, crime,
family stability, or investment in children could easily influence preferences about alternative
income distributions.
In principle, a distinction can be made between means and ends, but in practice they might
be difficult to distinguish because a particular end might be seen as a means to some other end.
This issue can hardly be resolved within the scope of this paper, but it is worth emphasizing that
the large policy differences we found among economists were much more closely related to their
values than to their estimates of the economic parameters that are theoretically relevant to those
policies. Differences in values lead economists to support different policies. However, contrary
to "de gustibus non est disputandum," the research agenda should not stop there. We need to
-26-identi& other kinds of positive questions that might be influencing economists' values, and we
need to find answers to those questions.
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-30-FIGURE 1. HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION OF "OVERCONFIDENCE"












B = Best Estimate
C=Confidence Interval
1,2 = Respondents 1 and 2
-31-TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO POLICY QUESTIONS
POLICY QUESTIONS















































MeanSt DevMedian InterquartileRange % NO+NA
1. Increase AFDC Benefits 38 29 38 9—58 49 3
2. Increase Gasoline Tax 73 31 84 62 95 34 0
3. Adopt VAT 41 27 41 16 61 45 1
4. Eliminate OASI Cap 51 31 53 20 81 61 4
5. Expand IRAs -52 31 52 25 80 54 1
6. State Education Financing 56 29 61 36 81 45 0







43.6TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF BEST ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC PARAMETERS





















































































































MeanSt DevMedian lnterquartiie_Range % NO+NA
20.1986 Tax Change—>% A GDP 2.03 3.60 1.00 0.20 3.00 2.80 30














































14. CurrentlFair Annuity Price














































































22TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO VALUES AND
POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION QUESTIONS



































































































3 2TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION AMONG POLICY OPINIONS,
BEST ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC PARAMETERS, AND VALUES
LABOR ECONOMICS
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN: Number of Median Percent of Coefficients
Coefficients Coefficient' p c 0.05 p < 0.01
Values and policy opinions 24 0.53 88 75
Values and economic parameters 56 0.18 30 16
Economic parameters and policy opinions 84 0.18 25 8
Theoretically related questions" 10 0.19 40 30
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN: Number of Median Percent of Coefficients
Coefficients Coefficient' p C 0.05 p C 0.01
Values and policy opinions 28 0.35 79 64
Values and economic parameters 56 0.15 18 7
Economic parameters and policy opinions 98 0.13 10 5
Theoretically related questions" 18 0.15 28 17
a. Absolute values.
b. E.g., "Effect of hi9her minimum wage on teenage employment" and "Increase minimum wage" in the LE Survey.
(See Tables 5 and 6 for full sets of theoretically related economic parameters and policy opinions.)
-35-TABLE 5. LABOR ECONOMICS:
SUMMARY OF OLS REGRESSIONS OF POLICY OPINIONS
SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING FULL SET OF CONTROL VARIABLES




1. Increase AFDC Benefits Q17 0.51 0.00 0.97 0.44 63
2. Eliminate OASI Cap Q16,17 0.12 0.01 0.37 0.21 61
3. Eliminate Affirmative Action Q20 0.02 0.03 0.69 0.36 64
4. Increase Minimum Wage Q13 0.94 0.00 0.23 0.53 64
5. Eliminate Job Training Q10,11,12 0.42 0.03 0.11 0.45 64
6. Increase Unionization Q18,19 0.45 0.00 0.32 0.50 58
Median 0.45
SEPARATE SPECIFICATIONS FOR EACH SET OF CONTROL VARIABLES
POLICY POSITION Economic Economic Values Party N
Parameter Parameters
Variable(s)
P-ValueAdj R2P-ValueAdj R2P-ValueAdj R2
1. Increase AFDC Benefits Q17 0.45 -0.01 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.24 63
2. Eliminate OASI Cap Q16,17 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.34 0.01 61
3. Eliminate Affirmative Action 020 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.21 64
4. Increase Minimum Wage Q13 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.36 64
5. Eliminate Job Training 010,11,12 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.37 64
6. Increase Unionization 018,19 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.33 58
Median 0.05 0.44 0.29
NOTE: Missing observations of right-hand-side variables have been replaced by means.
-36-TABLE 6. PUBLIC ECONOMICS:
SUMMARY OF OLS REGRESSIONS OF POLICY OPINIONS
SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING FULL SET OF CONTROL VARIABLES




1. Increase AFDC Benefits 012 0.30 0.00 0.14 0.4967
2. Increase Gasoline Tax 09 0.35 0.02 0.69 0.20 69
3. Adopt VAT 08,10,12,16, 0.39 0.01 0.13 0.21 68
16,20,21
4. Eliminate OASI Cap 012 0.90 0.01 0.20 0.37 66
5. Expand IRA5 013,16,18,20 0.03 0.02 0.37 0.26 68
6. State Education Financing 015 0.00 0.72 0.88 0.18 69
7. Mandatory Savings Accounts014,17,19 0.12 0.41 0.09 0.09 65
Median 0.21
SEPARATE SPECIFICATIONS FOR EACH SET OF CONTROL VARIABLES
POLICY POSITION Economic Economic Values Party -N
Parameter Parameters
Variable(s)
P-ValueAdj R2P-ValueAdj R2P-ValueAdj R2
1. Increase AFDC Benefits 012 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 67
2. Increase Gasoline Tax 09 0.58 -0.01 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.09 69
3. Adopt VAT 08,10,12,16,0.31 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.54 -0.01 68
18 .20,2 1
4. Eliminate OASI Cap 012 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.26 66
5. Expand IRA5 013,16,18,200.01 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.09 68
6. State Education Financing 015 0.00 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.32 0.01 69
7. Mandatory Savings Accounts014.17,19 0.13 0.04 0.59 -0.02 0.08 0.0865
Median 0.04 0.19 0.09
NOTE: Missing observations of right-hand-side variables have been replaced by means.
-37-TABLE 7. PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHOSE CONFIDENCE INTERVALS DO NOT











ECONOMIC PARAMETERS N Percent of Confidence Intervals That Do Not Include
Best Estimate Best Estimate Value
7. Ernploye?s_Share of Payroll Tax 54 51.9 32.7 22.2
44 40.9 27.3
10. JTPA->Youth Earnings 54 18.5 18.2 9.3
14. Marshall (men) Supply 52 26.9 17.3 17.3
Marshall (women) Supply 52 44.2 42.3 40.4
40 47.5 42.5 32.5





































ECONOMIC PARAMETERS N Percent of Confidence Intervals That Do Not Include
Mean Median Most Accepted
Best Estimate Best Estimate Value
8. % 6 Investment 44 36.4 22.7 22.7
9. Gas Demand (Hicks) 58 43.1 20.7 20.7
10. Wage Tax—>8 GDP Growth 56 41.1 25.0 23.2
11. Marshall (men) Supply 55 25.5 21.8 18.2
12. Hicks (men) Supply 52 30.8 21.2 21.2
13. % IRA—>Net Savings 55 27.3 14.3 12.7
Median 33.6 21.5 20.9
-38-TABLE 8. RATIOS OF AVERAGE WIDTHS OF CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
TO STANDARD DEVIATION AND TO INTERGUARTILE RANGE OF BEST ESTIMATE
LABOR ECONOMICS

































































ECONOMIC PARAMETERS N MEAN Cl/STDEV MEDIAN CI/ lQ
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20.0 2.00TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN WIDTH OF
CONFIDENCE INTERVAL AND ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE OF BEST ESTIMATE
FROM MEDIAN BEST ESTIMATE OF ECONOMIC PARAMETERS
LABOR ECONOMICS
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN: Number of Median Percent of Coefficients'
Coefficients Coefficient p C 0.05 p C 0.01
Th. same question 14 0.43 64 64
Not the same question 182 -0.01 14 8
Dissimilar 160 -0.03 8 3
Similar" 22 0.35 59 50
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Number of Median Percent 01' Coefficients'
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN:Coefficients Coefficient p < 0.05 p C 0.01
The same question 6 0.48 83 63
Not the same question 30 0.08 20 13
Dissimilar 28 0.06 18 14
Similar" 2 0.28 50 0
a. Coefficients that are positive and significant as percent of all coefficients.
b. E.g., the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities of labor supply.
-40-APPENDiX
LaborEconomics Survey






We are inviting a selected group of economists at the leading American research
universities to cooperate in an ongoing study. Our goal is to get a better
understanding of the relationships among positive and normative economic
research and public policy.
To that end, we ask you to please complete the attached survey and return it in
the enclosed envelope at your earliest convenience. Your replies will be strictly
anonymous to us and to our research assistants; the form is coded solely to allow
our secretary to send a reminder to anyone who has not returned the survey within
a few weeks.
In your replies, assume that the question refers to the U.S. in 1996. If you wish to
qualify a reply, please lot your comment on the back of the page.
Your:assistance is greatly appreciated. We will send you the preliminary results
when they are tabulated./
Sincerely,
Victor H. Fuchs Alan B. Krueger
Identicalletter sent with the Public Economics





Questions 1 through 6: Please indicate your opinion of each of the following policy proposals by
placinga verticalmark on the corresponding horizontal line.
Note that we intend to use a continuous scale.
No
opinion
1. Increase AFDC benefits financed by a
revenue-neutral, proportional increase in
all marginal income tax rates.
2. Eliminate the current cap on taxable
wages under the OASI payroll tax, offset
by a revenue-neutral reduction of the
payroll tax rate.
3. Eliminate the OFCCP Affirmative
Action program (i.e., eliminate Executive
Order 11246).
4. Increase the minimum wage from
$4.25 to $5.15 per hour over two years.
5. Eliminate the federal role in job
training, with the cost savings applied to
deficit reduction. Most significantly, this
proposal will eliminate the JTPA
program, which at $4 billion per year, is
the largest federal job training program.
6. Change the labor laws to permit
workers to form a union if a majority of
workers in the bargaining unit signs
cards (in a reasonable period of time)
































favorLabor Economics, 7/31% Page2 of 4
Questioas 7-20: Please give your best estimate of a quantity (x), along with your best estimate of the 95%
confidence Interval for x. This confidence Interval is defined as Ix1,x], such that Pr(x <x1)=
Pr(x>x2)=.025.The confidence intervals need not be symmetric; one could report, for example,
a best estimate of .50, with a confidence Interval of (.35,1.6].
Be sure to indicate a minus sign ((yourestimate isa negative quantity.
Best LowerUpper No
estimate boundboundopinion
7. The percentage of payroll taxes that is borne by
employers in the long run.
8. The total wage elasticity of labor demand.
9. The output-constant wage elasticity of labor
demand.
10. The percentage impact on annual earnings for
the average disadvantaged youth who undergoes
JTPA job training.
11. The percentage impact on annual earnings for
the average adult male who undergoes JTPA job
training.
12. The percentage impact on annual earnings for the
average adult female who undergoes JTPA job training.
13. The percentage change in employment of
teenagers caused by a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage.
-43-Labor Economici, 7/3/fl Page 3 of 4
Questions7 through 20, continued.
Besure to indicate aminus sign jf your estimate isa negative quantity.
Best LowerUpper No
estimate boundboundopinion
14. The uncompensated (i.e., Marshallian) elasticity
of labor supply for men ages 25-54.
15. The uncompensated (i.e., Marshallian) elasticity
of labor supply for women ages 25-54.
16. The compensated (i.e., HickMan) elasticity of
labor supply for men ages 25-54.
17. The compensated (i.e., Hicksian) elasticity of
labor supply for women ages 25-54.
18. The percentage impact of unions on the earnings
of thejr avenge member.
19. The percentage impact of unions on productivity
of unionized companies.
20. The percentage of the male-female wage gap
attributable to employer discrimination.
-44-Labor Economia, 7/3/96 Page 4 of 4
Questions 21 through 25: Please Indicate
corresponding horizontal line.
Notethatwe intend to use a continuous scale.
21. To understand the effects of job
training, I would give more credence to
results coming from studies that employ:
22. Compared with the present, the
federal government's role in income
redistribution should be:
23. Same as question 22, but assume
that the redistribution could be
accomplished with transfers that have no
price effects (i.e., with lump sum taxes
and transfers that have no distortionary
effects):
24. When public policy must choose
between equity and efficiency, it should
give more weight than it now does to:
25. When public policy must choose
between individual and social
responsibility, it should give more weight



















your opinion by placing a vertical mark on the
No113/96
PUBLIC ECONOMICS SURVEY
Quions 1 through 7: Please Indicate your opinion of each of the following policy proposals by
a vertical mark on the corresponding horizontal line.




1. Increase AFDC benefits financed by a
revenue-neutral,proportionalincrease in
allmarginalincome taxrates.
2. Increase the federal gasoline excise
tax by 25 cents per gallon, with proceeds
devoted to general revenues.
3. Replace the currentfederaltaxes on
personal income, corporate income, and
estates with a revenue-neutral value-
added tax.
4. Eliminate the current cap on taxable
wages under the OASI payroll tax offset
by a revenue-neutral reduction of the
payroll tax rate.
5. Raise the maximum annual IRA
contribution to $5,000 and restore "up
front" tax deductibility of IRA
contributions for all taxpayers regardless
of income level.
6. Move toward greater reliance than at
present on state-level as opposed to local-
level financing of public education.
7. Replace part of the current payroll
tax with a mandatory saving program in
which proceeds are invested in
individual-directed investment accounts
and annuitized at retirement (the "middle
road" plan recently discussed by the



































favorPublic F— 'aln, 7/3/96 Page2 of 4
Questions $ through 13: Please give your best estimate of a quantity (x), along with your best
estimate of the 95%confidenceinterval for x. This confidence interval Is defined as [x1, xj) such
that Pr (x <x,)=Pr(x >x2)=.025. Theconfidence intervals need not be symmetric; one
could report, for example, a best estimate of .50, with a confidence interval of [.35, 1.6].
Be sun to indicate a minus sign jfyourestimate is a negative quantity.
Best Lower Upper No
estimate bound bound opinion
8. The percentage increase or decrease in
investment in plant and equipment over the next five
years that would result from a permanent change in
the corporate income tax law to allow expensing of
all capital investment, financed by a higher corporate
income tax rate.
9. The compensated (i.e., Hicksian) price elasticity
of demand for gasoline in the United States over a
horizon of two to five years.
10. The percentage point change in the avenge
GDP growth rate over the next ten years if all capital
income taxes in the United States were replaced by a
revenue-neutral wage tax.
11. The uncompensated (i.e., Marshallian) elasticity
of labor supply for men ages 25-54.
12. The compensated (i.e., Hicksian) elasticity of
labor supply for men ages 25-54.
13. The percentage of the inflows to IRA's during
the 1981-1986 period that represented net additions
to national saving.
-47-Public Econocks, 73/96 Page 3of 4
Questions14 through21: Please giveyour best estimate or guess.
&sure to indicate a minus sign ([your estimate is a negative quantity.
Best No
estimate opinion
14.The ratio of thecurrentmarket price of purchasing an immediate life
annuity at age 65 to the actuarially fair price of such an annuity.
15. The percentage change in avenge student test scores that would follow
from a shift from the present state/local responsibility for financing public
education to a system in which all funds were from the state.
16. The percentage of the current corporate income tax in the United States
that is ultimately borne by capital.
17. The average U.S. personal saving rate between 1990 and 1994, if Social
Security had never been enacted. For reference, the actual personal saving rate
in the National Income and Product Accounts averaged 5.0 percent of
disposable income.
18. The fraction of household net worth held by households in the top 1% of
the net worth distribution.
19. The ratio of the administrative costs of a system of private, mandatory
retirement saving accounts to the administrative costs of the current Social
Security System.
The percentage change in steady-state GDP that would have been associated
with each of the following tax reforms, if they had been allowed to remain in
force until the economy reached a new steady state:
20. 1986 Tax Reform Act
2L 1993 Budget Enforcement Act
-48-Public Lainanics, 7/3/96 Page 4 of 4
Questions 22 through 25: Please indicate
corresponding horizontal line.
Note that we intendto usea continuous scale.
22. Compared with the present, the
federal government's role in income
redistribution should be:
23.Same as question 22, but assume that
the redistribution could be accomplished
with transfers that have no effects
(i.e., assuming lump sum taxes and
transfers that have no distortionary
effects):
24. When public policy must choose
between equity and efficiency, it should
give more weight than it now does to:







25. When public policy must choose
between individual responsibility and
social responsibility, it should give more
weight than it now does to:
rnpomibliMy
26. Please circle the best description of your political party identification.
Democrat Republican Independent
-49-
Other
L
equity
J ________